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Abstract 
This article aims to theorise about how dynamics of party competition influence 
government decisions to engage in foreign policy change. It shows how a focus on the 
functioning of polarized two-party competition in Greece in the late 1990s sheds light 
on crucial questions concerning the content, timing and institutionalization of Greece’s 
decision to allow the EU to grant Turkey candidate-member status. The article 
problematizes this foreign policy change as a decision influenced, among other factors, 
by the demands of party competition, and especially the strategy of the then ruling 
socialist party. More generally, this article shows how a focus on party politics 
complements in various interesting ways our understanding of foreign policy decisions 
and foreign policy change. Party system dynamics are shown to act as significant 
intervening factors between determinants of foreign policy usually analyzed in the 
literature and eventual foreign policy change.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The decision of Greece to allow the EU to grant Turkey candidate-member status in 
the December 1999 EU Council in Helsinki marks the most important change in Greek 
foreign policy since the establishment of the democratic regime in 1974. In this article I 
aim to draw attention to a little-discussed dimension of the process that led to Greece’s 
foreign policy change, namely the dynamics of the Greek party system that embedded the 
strategies of foreign policy decision makers and informed to a significant degree the timing 
and content of that change. Party politics is a relatively understudied topic in the analysis 
of foreign policy, however in democratic regimes party competition filters in a substantial 
way the effect of factors usually analyzed in works of foreign policy analysis. Especially 
in Greece, where political parties have occupied a ‘hegemonic position’ in society (Kalyvas 
1997, 99), the absence of a systematic incorporation of findings from the party politics 
literature in the study of foreign policy is all the more striking.  
This article has a double goal: The first is to show how a focus on the dynamics of party 
competition significantly complements our understanding of foreign policy change, and 
especially of such aspects as the content of new policies, the timing that change takes place, 
and the degree of institutionalization of new policies. The second is to show how, in 
Greece, the key systemic characteristic of party competition between 1981 and 2011 – 
polarization in a two-party system – filtered the ways Greece responded to outside 
challenges, new policy ideas came to influence policymaking, and new foreign policies 
became institutionalized in the long term. The article proceeds as follows: The first section 
presents the topic at hand (change in Greek foreign policy in the late 1990s) and discusses 
some prominent explanations of it. The second section presents the main structural 
characteristics of party competition in Greece, and the effects of a polarized two-party 
system on the outputs and contestation of foreign policy since 1981. The third section 
contains a theoretical discussion of how features of party competition, and especially 
polarization in a two-party system, are expected to influence three aspects of foreign policy 
change: its timing, content, and institutionalization. The fourth section contains the 
empirical bulk of the argument, showing how a party politics perspective complements 
existing accounts of Greek foreign policy change in Helsinki. The fifth section will 
conclude.   
 
2. GREEK FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE: FACTS AND CONCEPTUAL 
APPROACHES 
 
After the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, Greek-Turkish relations became strained 
by an increasing number of Turkish demands concerning sovereignty over air and sea in 
the Aegean (Heraclides 2007; Valinakis 1989)1. Added to the Cyprus impasse, this palette 
of ‘open’ bilateral issues created a Cold War-like atmosphere between two NATO allies 
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that led three times (1976, 1987 and 1996) to the brink of war. The tone in Greek-Turkish 
relations changed significantly after 1996 and the rise to power of Prime Minister Costas 
Simitis of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) who sought to decrease tensions 
and embed bilateral relations in a European framework. His strategy culminated in the 1999 
EU Council in Helsinki, where Greece threatened to veto the EU enlargement if Cyprus 
were not accepted in the EU without preconditions on the resolution of the occupation 
problem. In return, Greece allowed the EU to grant Turkey candidate-member status and 
adhered to a timeline for resolution of outstanding problems in the Aegean by 2004 through 
negotiation and, if this failed, recourse to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
(Heraclides 2007, 195-196; Tsakonas 2010, 91-95). Greece accepted the validity of 
Turkish demands in the Aegean (Tsakonas 2010, 19), but hoped that a ‘Europeanized’ 
Turkey would be a more amenable partner in negotiation.  
At the time, the main opposition party, New Democracy (ND) under Costas 
Karamanlis, opposed the Helsinki decision (Heraclides 2007, 198). Helsinki was de facto 
endorsed by the Greek public in the elections of April 2000, which PASOK won with a 
razor-thin margin against ND. Thereafter, the Simitis government initiated negotiations on 
outstanding issues in the Aegean and supported a reunification plan for Cyprus. A 
comprehensive deal between Greece and Turkey scheduled for 2004 was derailed by 
electoral developments. In March 2004, PASOK lost the election to ND and Karamanlis 
became Prime Minister, suspended bilateral negotiations and offered lackluster support to 
the reunification plan in Cyprus. That plan was resoundingly rejected by Greek-Cypriots 
in a referendum in April 2004. In May 2004 Cyprus was admitted to the EU. In December 
2004 the Karamanlis government forewent the possibility to refer outstanding bilateral 
issues with Turkey to the ICJ. Instead, it decided to use Turkey’s accession process to both 
deepen relations and extract concessions down the way (Heraclides 2007, 204-206). Since 
then, successive Greek governments have tried to maintain a calm climate in bilateral 
relations and support Turkey’s European course, even if changes in Turkey and the Euro 
crisis have left little room for active initiatives.  
Early academic analyses of Simitis’ foreign policy stressed the inherent strength of 
Europeanization in providing policy solutions and prescribing a vision of a liberal 
international order within which reconceptualized Greek national interests would be served 
(Ioakimidis 2000; Keridis 2001). A more sanguine account can be found in Tsardanidis 
and Stavridis (2005), who see Europe as an arena where Greece can promote effectively 
its goals rather than as a source for change of Greek policy 2 . International relations 
literature pointed to the fact that Greek foreign policy change was a response to wider 
changes in the region after the end of the Cold War (Ifantis 2004). Among more recent 
analyses, the most empirically exhaustive is that of Tsakonas (2010). Tsakonas lays a big 
premium on the personality of Simitis and his ability to find solutions in the face of policy 
failure. To Simitis’ ‘agentic’ culture he contrasts the ‘underdog’ culture of the Greek state 
and society. In this view, Greek foreign policy was Europeanized through the agency of 
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Simitis, precisely because Europe represented the type of problem-solving and 
modernizing culture Simitis wanted to transfuse into Greece. Blavoukos and Bourantonis 
(2012) on the other hand see foreign policy change as an outcome of political 
entrepreneurship (whereby political actors implement new policy ideas in order to reap 
future political rewards) under permissive institutional conditions. Blavoukos and 
Bourantonis locate the initiative for policy change in the preferences of entrepreneurs like 
Simitis, while they ascribe crucial role to the centralized system of government in Greece 
that allows leaders to implement changes almost unhindered once in power.  
Useful as these works are, they leave some theoretical and empirical questions 
unanswered. Existing literature on Greek foreign policy, for example, is quite ambiguous 
as to what kind of change Helsinki actually was. Did it represent a change of tactics towards 
the pursuit of the same goals, or did it entail a rearticulation of foreign policy goals as such? 
Following Charles Hermann’s (1990) typology and analysis of four gradations of foreign 
policy change (change of means, tactics, strategy/goals and of interests/strategic orientation 
altogether), it is probably most accurate to say that Helsinki is located somewhere between 
a change of means and a redefinition of a foreign policy goal as such. As we will see, the 
Greek government at the time argued in both directions. But this ambiguity of the exact 
nature of change in Helsinki is not something the literature tries to explain, but instead 
reflects back on scholarly work itself. Put simply, the way a scholar conceptualizes the 
change in Helsinki influences which theoretical framework she uses to explain it3. If one 
focuses on Helsinki’s novel aspects, one is predisposed to look at the effects of European 
norms and the strength of new policy ideas4. If one emphasizes continuity in Greek foreign 
policy after Helsinki, one also tends to ascribe primary importance to the strength of 
traditional conceptions of Greek interests or the adaptation to changing international 
conditions that required recalibration of means and ends of Greek foreign policy. Analyses 
of both streams shy from explaining the content of change itself – especially how the 
specific balance between continuity and change in Greek foreign policy arose. Here I am 
conscious of the need to locate Helsinki in a broader conceptual framework of foreign 
policy change and to problematize the kind of change that Helsinki eventually became. For 
this reason, I intend to leave the foreign policy factors I am interested in (party politics) to 
highlight for themselves how a specific policy response arose and how it came to be located 
in the place that it did in the continuum of foreign policy change developed by Hermann.  
The timing of change is also vaguely accounted for by prominent analyses. Leadership 
and agency fail to explain why Simitis (who was acknowledged to be a very little 
charismatic leader) would be the one to succeed in promoting foreign policy change, 
especially given how significant a departure it represented from his own party’s earlier 
positions. Blavoukos and Bourantonis complement their framework with the qualifying 
condition of a security crisis that paves the way for change – in the case of Simitis, the Imia 
crisis of 1996. The Imia crisis was unquestionably a shock, but by itself it cannot explain 
foreign policy change. Taken together, Imia and Simitis’ agency may account for why 
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change took place when it did, but not for why it did not take place earlier – for example 
under Konstantinos Mitsotakis, ND leader and Prime Minister in 1990-1993, himself an 
exponent of the ‘agentic culture’ per Tsakonas, who wanted to anchor Greece to Europe 
and adapt its foreign policy to the demands of EU membership5. If Helsinki was a response 
to macro-level pressures on Greek foreign policy after the Cold War or to the direct 
challenges posed by the Imia crisis, none of the existing accounts explains why very few 
tangible changes took place before December 1999. Blavoukos and Bourantonis engage 
with the question of the time lag, but are forced to take recourse to factors beyond their 
explanatory model and mention party-political conditions that kept Simitis from instituting 
his preferred policy earlier. The partisan dimension is also present in Tsakonas and 
Heraclides’ analyses. Clearly the role of party politics needs to be systematically 
incorporated in analyses of this foreign policy change.  
Finally, one issue that existing analyses overlook is institutionalization of the new 
foreign policy. Regardless of whether one sees the change in Helsinki as a rational response 
to changing international conditions or as the result of socialization and the impact of 
Europe, the fact that it only required a government change in 2004 for crucial elements of 
the Helsinki decision to change raises the theoretical need to clarify which conditions affect 
the degree of institutionalization of a new foreign policy.  
 
3. THE GREEK PARTY SYSTEM AND FOREIGN POLICY 1974-1999 
 
For 30 years Greek party politics revolved around competition between two major 
parties, the conservative New Democracy (ND) and the socialist Panhellenic Socialist 
Movement (PASOK). That two-party system was instituted with PASOK’s victory in 1981 
and its dynamics were an object of debate among scholars of Greek politics. 
Mavrogordatos (1984) took into account the role of a then strong Communist party to the 
left of PASOK and the division of Greek politics in three camps – Right, Centre and Left 
– and characterized the Greek party system as one of ‘limited but polarized pluralism’. 
Later, Pappas, focusing on the parties with credible chance of gaining power, claimed that 
the Greek party system had become a typical two-party system (Pappas 2001, 2003) where 
the two parties were increasingly seeking the middle ground. This was in accordance with 
developments throughout the 1990s, when PASOK and ND converged to a policy profile 
of economic liberalization and modernization. Yet policy convergence contrasted with the 
fact that each party, when in opposition, viciously undermined the government. Following 
the Eurozone crisis and the collapse of both parties’ support, Pappas argued that bipolar 
competition between ND and PASOK had in fact been a polarized one (in a strategic rather 
than ideological sense) (Pappas 2013).  
The Greek two-party system was peculiar not just because each of the two parties 
defined itself as opposition to the other (a normal feature of two-party systems), but 
because that competition was animated by the effort to discredit the opponent more than 
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attract middle-ground moderate voters6. This polarized two-partyism is even more peculiar 
given the small policy differences between the two parties, especially in the 1990s and 
2000s, which makes the use of the term ‘polarization’ (that is very common in Greek 
political parlance) problematic from an analytical and comparative perspective. In fact, 
two-party competition in Greece resembled competition between two programmatically 
rigid and incompatible parties, when this was patently not the case, at least after the 1980s. 
In the place of policy differences, polarization in the Greek party system can be explained 
from a systemic perspective with reference to the origins of the two-party system in the 
three-camp structure of Greek politics (as per Mavrogordatos), and in terms of (absence 
of) policy content with reference to the historical identities carried over from civil conflicts 
of the 20th century and the fierce competition for clientelist spoils (Kalyvas 1997). These 
factors explain the fact that two-party competition in Greece was polarized as if it were 
programmatic – a policy-empty polarization as it were. Yet, what was the exact content 
and language of polarization that animated two-party competition?  
The most refined analysis of the mechanics of polarization in Greece has been offered 
by Moschonas (1994), who explained how the party-heir of the Centre political identity, 
PASOK, had built its political dominance after 1981 on an assiduous anti-Right 
polarization and the discursive construction of a majoritarian ‘democratic camp’ (spanning 
the Centre and Left political identities) (also Kalyvas 1997, 86-87). By emphasizing its 
own character as a bulwark against the heir of the political identity of the Right, ND, from 
returning to power, PASOK (and especially its charismatic founder, Andreas Papandreou) 
created a partisan identity that merged the traditional opposition of the Centre camp to the 
Right with the frustrations of the Left as the loser of the Civil War. Moschonas argued that, 
as the anti-Right camp was bigger than the Right, PASOK’s ability to energize the anti-
Right feelings of voters of this camp also ensured its dominance. Presenting its competition 
with ND in binary apocalyptic terms was a self-reinforcing strategy for PASOK7. On the 
other hand, ND, confined to the political identity of the Right, had to engage with 
polarization in a different way: While it had to energize its own supporters with constant 
opposition to PASOK’s actions in government, it also had to develop a profile that appealed 
to voters of the non-Right camp (Pappas and Dinas 2006).  
In all, PASOK ruled for 21 years between 1981 and 2011 (1981-1989, 1993-2004 and 
2009-2011), and ND 8 (1990-1993 and 2004-2009). The contestation and outputs of 
foreign policy during this period closely reflected the dynamics of polarized two-party 
competition. PASOK’s foreign policy in the 1980s represented a significant departure from 
the pro-Western foreign policy of Greece of the previous half century. While ND had 
severed relations with NATO after 1974, it had put forth Greece’s entry to the European 
Economic Community as an alternative anchoring point to the West. PASOK had been 
vehemently opposed to entry to the EEC but after it came to power it did not try to take 
Greece out of NATO or EEC. Instead Papandreou put forth a maverick foreign policy in 
the context of the Cold War, a rapprochement with the ‘Third World’ and Arab states, and, 
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most importantly, a policy of tension against Turkey (Huliaras 1989; Loulis 1984). Even 
though ND governments of 1974-1981 had tried to keep open the channels of 
communication with Turkey, PASOK suspended all but most basic contacts.  
After 1981, ND supported a policy of moderation towards Turkey (Tsakonas 2010, 48). 
However PASOK’s dominance in 1981-1989 institutionalized a new foreign policy 
whereby Greece only accepted as an issue the demarcation of the continental shelf in the 
Aegean, which should be resolved in the ICJ, and declined to discuss any other issues 
concerning air space and sea borders (Athanassopoulou 1997, 77; Heraclides 2007; 
Tsakonas 2010, 46-47)8. Greece used the EEC as a forum to voice its concerns over its 
disputes with Turkey in Cyprus and the Aegean. This added to the perception that Greece 
was a ‘difficult’ partner in the EU, leading to its isolation on various occasions (Tsakonas 
2010, 48-51; Tsoukalis 2000, 47). Consistent with its effort to overcome polarization, ND 
internalized the continental shelf policy, even though it continued to fret that PASOK 
would marginalize Greece within the West and Europe. 
After the end of the Cold War, a different foreign policy issue, the Macedonia-name 
dispute, came to upset the balance of the Greek party system. The mass mobilization for 
the name of Macedonia crystalized a latent cleavage running through the old structure of 
Right, Centre and Left, and highlighted the increasingly tenuous hold of polarization over 
Greek voters in the post-Cold War world (Vernardakis 2011, 165). This cleavage pitted 
those holding fundamental views of Greek national interests against modernizers who 
promoted watered-down understandings of Greek national interests for the sake of 
Greece’s connection with Europe and domestic modernization (Nicolacopoulos 2005, 272; 
Tsoukalis 2000, 41). This cleavage ran through the party system, as evidenced in the split 
between conservatives and liberals in ND that brought down the Mitsotakis government in 
1993, and the succession race in PASOK between modernizers and populists after 
Papandreou stepped down in 1996 (Vernardakis 2011, 241-242).  
The dynamics of two-party polarization were still present in the 1990s: PASOK 
challenged ND’s efforts in 1990-1993 to embed Greek foreign policy issues (Greek-
Turkish relations and the Macedonia-name issue) in a European framework and promote 
more ‘pragmatic’ readings of the Greek national interest. After the 1996 change of 
leadership in PASOK and the entry into the post of Prime Minister of modernizer Costas 
Simitis, modernizing pro-European foreign policy ideas were now being carried by the 
leadership of a political party whose dominance had been until then based on a much 
different policy set. ND on the other hand, disarrayed after two consecutive defeats in the 
elections of 1993 and 1996, was faced with the opposite dilemma: To face a governing 
party that was increasingly moving towards its own positions, thus increasing its own 
marginalization.  
 
4. TWO-PARTY SYSTEMS, POLARIZATION AND FOREIGN POLICY 
CHANGE 
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Even though it feels like an obvious topic of research in foreign policy analysis, there 
has been relatively little conceptual and comparative work on foreign policy change as 
such9. What seems to arise from these works is a conceptualization of foreign policy change 
primarily as a response to changes in a state’s international environment. In systemic views 
of international relations, the degree to which foreign policy will change reflects the nature 
of international pressures on a state’s foreign policy. In practice it is more accurate to say 
that these international pressures will be ‘read’ differently by policymakers, political 
actors, and parties. Foreign policy change has to be problematized as a specific type of 
response that arises out of a certain bundle of decision-making processes and domestic 
political conditions. It is neither automatic nor inevitable but a contingent policy decision 
in face of new international conditions. And while new policy ideas may arise in the minds 
of policymakers or in various institutional environments, how they are put into practice 
depends on the general context of policymaking.  
In liberal democracies foreign policy decisions are influenced, among others, by 
features of party competition, as they intervene between specific policy responses to 
external change and the final implementation of a new foreign policy10. Party system 
scholars see political parties as embedded in structures of competition that are 
characterized by their format (number of relevant parties) and properties (patterns of 
interaction between parties) (Bardi and Mair 2008; Sartori 1976). Party systems codify 
parameters of competition (patterns of opposition and interaction) and a ‘language of 
politics’ that gives meaning to interaction among parties. This language of politics does 
not just underline competition between parties, but also structures the electorate to the 
confines of competition between established forces and anticipates the rise of challengers 
(Mair 1997). Politicians in party democracies are constituted by their party systems in the 
sense that they are provided with conceptions of political identity (who is against whom 
and for what reason) and understandings of tactical interest11. The way a party’s foreign 
policy positions will be translated into state foreign policies is not simply a matter of direct 
implementation of partisan preferences when the party is in power, but the outcome of 
interactions within the party system. Thus the party system becomes an intervening 
variable between changing international conditions, new policy ideas, and eventual foreign 
policy change. One can hypothesize then that features of a party system (along with other 
factors of course) will influence the way political parties contest foreign policy, and 
therefore condition the ways new policy ideas (responses to new international conditions) 
become translated into new policies.  
In a ‘majoritarian’ democracy (with executive dominance over the parliament and 
single-party governments) (Lijphart 1999), it is normal to expect each major party to define 
itself to a large degree as opposition to what the opponent is doing. The peculiarity of the 
Greek party system was that programmatic convergence went hand in hand with a 
persistent structure and language of polarization, within which new policy ideas had to be 
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articulated and put through. Polarization as a systemic feature superseded policy 
convergence, thus making Greek two-partyism not just a competition between parties that 
oppose each other as a matter of principle (which is normal in two-party systems, even 
when the two parties are indistinguishable policy-wise, e.g. in Ireland (Mair 1987)), but a 
competition akin to the one between deeply ideological and programmatic parties that see 
each other as fundamentally incompatible and even dangerous (e.g. Great Britain in the 
early 1980s (Rose 1984)). In foreign policy, the elites of both PASOK and ND had by the 
late-1990s converged to the acceptance of the need for Greece to remain anchored in 
Europe and hence also, in light of the post-Cold War strategic environment, to change 
aspects of its foreign policy as they had been institutionalized since the 1980s. However, 
pushing through and contesting new policies could only take place in a framework not only 
of simple government-opposition dynamics, but of a specific language of delegitimating 
the opponent. This discursive framework of polarization within which two-party system 
dynamics were embedded had important repercussions on specific aspects of foreign policy 
change.  
In majoritarian systems with policy-based polarized two-party competition, one 
expects foreign policy change to take place in a way that reflects developments in political 
competition (e.g. party turnover in government), even in the absence of international 
stimuli for change. Party turnover in government when polarization in Greece still reflected 
incompatible programmatic agendas (when PASOK first entered power in 1981 and ND 
returned to power in 1990)12 produced significant shifts in foreign policy, and foreign 
policy was part of intense contestation between the two parties during that time. The two 
parties did not just bitterly contest tactics of foreign policy, but polarized two-party 
competition also produced new long-lasting understandings of Greek interests (the 
continental shelf position is the most obvious and durable outcome of this period for Greek 
foreign policy, following PASOK’s rise as a dominant political force in the 1980s). If 
programmatic distance between the two main parties is small on the other hand, chances 
are foreign policy change will not be endogenous to party competition (e.g. follow party 
turnover in power) but instead react to external stimuli (as expected by most theories of 
foreign policy change).  
Generally a two-party system with single-party governments dominating policymaking 
is inviting for bearers of new policy ideas supporting change: If they can take over one of 
the two major parties, they can hope that their ideas will be implemented with little regard 
for opposition concerns. But the interaction between polarization and policy distance 
conditions how new policy ideas are expected to play out. In policy-based polarization (as 
Greece was in the 1980s) only ideas that reflect the programmatic and ideological 
incompatibility between the two parties can hope to take hold of either of them. On the 
other hand, two-party systems with high systemic polarization but small policy distance 
between the major parties, as Greece was in the 1990s, present a mix of constraints and 
opportunities for new policy ideas: Small policy distance means that each party is more 
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open to new policy ideas than what it would be under conditions of ideologically polarized 
competition; and polarization further underpins the tendency of the party in government to 
put through foreign policy change over the concerns of the opposition. But polarization 
also serves to curtail the effect of these ideas, and the potential degree of change these 
imply, if these ideas are seen to contradict a party’s strategy in polarization or overtly 
decrease policy distance between two parties that after all have to maintain the image of 
fundamental opposition between them. 
This raises the question why such policy ideas that may seem incompatible with a 
party’s self-understanding as fundamental opposition to another party would become 
accepted in the first place. To answer this question one needs to look closer to the specific 
content of party competition embedding a two-party system. I assume that in a polarized 
party system not all parties are constrained the same way by polarization. Polarization is a 
favourable condition for some parties, but an obstacle for others. As we saw, in Greece 
after 1981 the polarization of the party system was wholly congruent with the strategic 
needs of PASOK, which had imposed a specific reading of what party competition was 
about and thrived on it. In this context, new policy ideas are easier to put through when 
carried by parties that can match them with the dominant language of polarization, as 
opposed to being carried by parties that want to overcome this language. This answers to a 
considerable extent the question of timing of foreign policy change: Until new policy ideas 
take over a party occupying a favourable position in the overall structure of polarization, 
ideas for change may waver in search of a host or may be defeated if carried by parties 
hampered by the direction of competition. And the best way for new foreign policy ideas 
to take over a party in a favourable position of polarization is for their proponents to portray 
them as congruent with this party’s strategy of polarization – which may call for these 
policy ideas to be toned down and their potential to bring about a high degree of foreign 
policy change to be curtailed.  
Finally, polarization also affects the degree of institutionalization of a new foreign 
policy. New policies (especially in foreign policy) usually survive simple change of 
government. However, in programmatically polarized party systems, there is always the 
chance that elements of a new foreign policy will change with party turnover in government 
(even in the absence of external stimuli, if the two parties represent fundamentally 
antithetical models of domestic governance). As a rule of thumb, one can say that a new 
foreign policy becomes entrenched the more time it remains unaltered. The potential for 
reversal of foreign policy change also decreases as policy distance between parties 
decreases. However, institutionalization of a new foreign policy will still suffer under 
polarization, even if parties have converged programmatically. I expect that a new foreign 
policy will remain partially institutionalized under conditions of policy-empty 
polarization, as every time a party enters office it will want to showcase some principled 
opposition to its predecessor’s policies, with the potential of reversal of this new foreign 
policy decreasing the more time passes from when it was enacted.  
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Type of two-
party system 
Are external stimuli 
necessary for 
foreign policy 
change? 
 
Degree of change expected 
 
Timing 
Institutiona-
lization of 
new foreign 
policy 
 
Policy-based 
polarization  
No  
(change can follow 
party turnover in 
power) 
Potentially very high  
(strategic goals or even wholesale 
reorientation) 
 
Party turnover in 
government 
 
Precarious 
 
Policy-empty 
polarization  
 
Yes 
 
Potentially high  
(will reflect specific polarization 
needs of host parties) 
Policy ideas 
pushing for change 
become hosted by a 
party in a 
favourable position 
in polarization 
 
 
Partial 
 
No 
polarization 
 
Yes 
 
Will reflect the strength of 
international stimuli, but normally 
modest  
Policy ideas 
pushing for change 
become hosted by 
either party 
 
 
Secure 
Table 1: 
The effect of polarization in two-party systems on dimensions of foreign policy change 
 
5. GREEK FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE IN HELSINKI AND PARTY SYSTEM 
POLARIZATION  
 
In a system of policy-empty two-party polarization we expect that international 
conditions are the main source of foreign policy change. In the Greek foreign policy change 
in Helsinki, the international context in late 1999 was of course a decisive factor for the 
new foreign policy to unfold, as the EU was discussing its forthcoming enlargement and 
enough governments of member-states were open to the prospect of Turkey eventually 
becoming a member (or at least extending the candidate status at that point). However the 
Greek government found itself in the position to push for what became the Helsinki 
compromise only after a long period of resistance by the governing party. I argue that, even 
in light of conducive international factors, had this partisan hurdle not been cleared, the 
new foreign policy would not have been enacted on the time it did. What is more, the 
dynamics of two-party competition in Greece go a long way towards explaining not only 
the specific timing of the Helsinki change during the first term of the Simitis government, 
but why Europeanization of foreign policy arose and took hold ten years after the end of 
the Cold War.  
Most analyses of the foreign policy change that culminated in Helsinki take into 
account party politics to explain why Simitis was unable to implement his foreign policy 
immediately after he came into power in 1996, despite the burden of the Imia crisis. Much 
like his economic policies of budgetary consolidation met with severe resistance by the 
party’s populist left wing (Vernardakis 2011, 46), that same wing also set obstacles to his 
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initiatives towards dialogue with Turkey (Athanassopoulou 1997, 96; Heraclides 2007, 
165-178; Tsardanidis 1998, 308-309). Local and European elections defeats in 1998-1999 
were a signal to the Simitis government that its program of austerity had reached the limits 
of tolerance among the party’s traditional audience in the ‘democratic camp’ 
(Nicolacopoulos 2005, 277; Vernardakis 2011, 58-60). PASOK was trailing ND in opinion 
polls throughout 1998 and the first half of 1999, something ascribed to disillusion of the 
party’s traditional voters with Simitis’ policies. However, in the course of 1999, Simitis 
and his government managed to overcome intra-party opposition, which allowed his 
government to institute the change in Helsinki in December (Heraclides 2007, 65-78). That 
Simitis managed to win over his own party is generally seen as the decisive juncture for 
other factors (like new policy ideas or the normative attractiveness of Europe) to play out 
and Helsinki to take place (Heraclides 2007, 194; Tsakonas 2010, 75). 
The most forceful justification for the change that became Helsinki was ‘domestic’ in 
nature (Economides 2005, 481-482; Kranidiotis 2000, 32). The prospect of entering the 
Eurozone remained very popular among a majority of Greeks (even if much fewer people 
were willing to shoulder the required sacrifices, Vernardakis 2011, 26-39). Even though 
that same public opinion (including many PASOK voters) was also very reluctant towards 
the idea of Turkey becoming an EU candidate-member13, the popularity of Europe allowed 
the government to match the idea of ‘Europeanized’ relations with Turkey to a domestic 
policy set that was quite popular. Greece needed normalization of its relationship with 
Turkey both because fiscal consolidation called for decrease of military spending 
(Couloumbis 2000, 382; Tsakonas 2010, 62-64), and because entering the ‘hard core of 
Europe’ required a recalibration of Greek foreign policy towards European interests and 
practices (Tsoukalis 2000, 49-50).  
The new foreign policy (and Helsinki specifically) could be seen then as consistent 
with PASOK’s electoral goals. Yet the party mechanism and its traditional voter base had 
shown little enthusiasm for Europeanization since 1996 – be it of domestic or foreign 
policies. Under conditions of binary polarization, Simitis would have to convince that the 
‘domestic’ justifications of the new foreign policy were consistent with the party’s interests 
in a structure of polarization (Tsakonas 2010, 77). This indeed happened as a series of 
fortunate events fed success for the government: As the prospect of Greece ‘locking in’ its 
entry to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) increased throughout the fall of 1999, and 
as the standing of the government improved in opinion polls ahead of elections that would 
have to be called no later than October 200014, so did the willingness of members of all 
PASOK wings to hedge their bets on Simitis’ agenda across both domestic and foreign 
policy (Vernardakis 2011, 26).  
This became all the easier since PASOK was favourably placed in the structure of 
polarization. As the party had created and been identified with the dominant narrative of 
party competition in Greece (the democratic camp against the Right), the new foreign 
policy ideas that pointed towards change would have much better chances if carried by a 
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party in a favourable position in the party system, provided that these foreign policy ideas 
could be assimilated in this narrative. In fact, this is exactly what happened: Once an 
inclusive message of reform of the Greek polity beyond partisan divisions, by 1999 
modernization had become absorbed in the partisan strategy of apocalyptic struggle 
between PASOK and the Right. The normative terms of the conflict changed: the 
‘progress’ of the 1990s was no longer the populist economic redistribution of the 1980s 
but European integration and social modernization. The ‘reaction’ of the 1990s was no 
longer a semi-authoritarian Right but a conservative, backward looking ND that would 
marginalize Greece in Europe15. The point when the PASOK mechanism was convinced 
of the congruence between modernization and anti-Right polarization (sometime during 
fall 1999) was the turning point after which the new foreign policy also became possible.  
The conceptual lens of the party system does not just explain the timing of the foreign 
policy change within the context of Simits’ rule; it can also explain why Europeanization 
of Greek foreign policy only took place in the late 1990s and only after having been 
accepted by a party that previously had been identified with populist foreign policy. A 
comparison between the position Simits and PASOK found themselves in in 1999 and the 
experience of the pro-European ND government under Mitsotakis in the early 1990s is 
instructive as regards the role of party politics in the timing of foreign policy change. The 
position of modernizing leaderships in both cases was precarious, and the danger of internal 
split of each party equally big. Yet the government of Mitsotakis was the one that suffered 
a split and defeat in 1993, while Simitis not only survived but won reelection in 2000. Even 
if it was significantly pro-Western, Mitsotakis’ foreign policy in the early 1990s went less 
far toward rapprochement with Turkey than Simitis’. While one can claim that the 
international climate and the experience of the Imia crisis was decisive in helping Simitis 
put through his new ideas, Mitsotakis also functioned under a favorable international 
environment as a liberal centre-right leader who came to power exactly when communism 
collapsed and the West was triumphant.  
The reality was that for Mitsotakis polarization was a, devastating as it turned out, 
obstacle, while for Simitis it became an asset. Faced with intense opposition by a still 
populist PASOK against its economic and foreign policies (Eleftheriou and Tassis 2013, 
142), ND under Mitsotakis invited the familiar accusations (mounted by the ‘democratic 
camp’ towards the Right) of subservience and weakness – especially since a different 
foreign policy issue, the Macedonia name-dispute, had arisen as a very salient and 
emotional topic in public debate. Even if they are two different issues, both Greek-Turkish 
relations and the Macedonia name-issue presented the two main parties with difficult 
decisions as they juggled new international conditions and significant internal divides 
between modernizers and nationalists. In 1993, ND fractured under the pressure of this 
divide. Just a few years later, PASOK’s strategic position in polarized competition became 
the perfect vehicle for Simitis to put through his own ideas that actually were more 
advanced than anything Mitsotakis himself had attempted. With party competition 
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revolving around the competition between a minoritarian Right and a majoritarian anti-
Right, the latent cleavage cutting through the entire party system could be negotiated more 
easily by the party benefiting from and fostering the language of polarization underpinning 
two-party competition. Hence paradoxically, rapprochement with Turkey finally came 
from politicians functioning from within the hitherto nationalistic and anti-Western 
‘democratic camp’16.  
Party system dynamics, and especially polarization, also filtered the effect of new 
policy ideas on Greek foreign policy. The change in Helsinki represented potentially a far-
reaching rethinking of Greek foreign policy: away from a hostile view of Turkey and a 
maximalist reading of Greek interests to a view of Turkey as a partner and the acceptance 
of a pacified liberal order in the region under the auspices of the EU as a goal in its own, 
which in turn justified a reassessment of Greek interests in the Aegean (Tsakonas 2010). 
Given the Simitis government’s adamant prioritization of Greek entry to the Eurozone, 
‘Europeanization’ of Greek-Turkish relations was seen as a very important development 
not only in its own right, but also as part of the wider policy set of ‘modernization’. Based 
on the ideas of Simitis and his circle of policymakers, and also given the general 
international and European context at the time, Greece could potentially enact in the 
culmination of these movements a foreign policy change high on Hermann’s scale. This 
however was not the case: Both in terms of how the new policy was presented after Helsinki 
and in important actions of the Simitis government, Greek foreign policy retained a 
commitment to traditionally defined goals, even if these were reformulated to fit Greece’s 
European aspirations. Party competition set the limits of how much change was possible 
(both practically and rhetorically).  
Following the Helsinki Council, the Simitis government emphasized the recalibration 
of the relationship between the pursuit of Greek national interests and Greece’s 
commitments arising from its EU membership17. Arguments along these lines stressed the 
political and economic benefits of a Europeanized Turkey and of Europeanization of 
Greek-Turkish relations (Kranidiotis 2000, 35; Tsakonas 2010, 96-97). Nevertheless, 
PASOK modernizers also argued about Helsinki with reference to traditional conceptions 
of Greek interests and dominant discourses in Greek foreign policy (Tsardanidis and 
Stavridis 2005). In the campaign for the April 2000 elections (that were called by Simitis 
prematurely to capitalize on the perceived success of Helsinki and the forthcoming entry 
into the Eurozone) PASOK emphasized the congruence of Helsinki with Greek foreign 
policy goals traditionally understood, forcing Turkey into concessions without alienating 
Greece from its European partners (Economides 2005, 484; Tsakonas 2010, 80-81). Even 
more critically, the government very vocally held to the mantra that Greece only accepted 
the demarcation of the continental shelf as a legitimate point of difference in the Aegean 
(Heraclides 2007, 202; Tsakonas 2010, 99-100). In addition, while normalization of 
relations with Turkey was supposed to assist the goal of fiscal consolidation, the Simitis 
government approved a massive armaments program. The improvement of Greece’s 
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deterrence capabilities was then used by Simitis to show that Greece still planned for all 
contingencies in the Aegean18.  
The foreign policy practices and justifications of the government after Helsinki 
corresponded, almost point-by-point, to the needs of PASOK at the time. With a governing 
party in a party system of binary polarization as the host of their ideas, Simitis and 
modernizers were in a position to put through their policies as long as they were seen as 
congruent with PASOK’s strategic needs. Presented as a tool used for the more effective 
promotion of traditional foreign policy goals, but also embedded in an ambitious and 
assertive language of innovative change, Helsinki served to bridge the divide between 
modernizers and nationalists inside the non-Right camp and maintain the credibility of 
PASOK as an anti-Right force. The insistence on the continental shelf mantra and the 
armaments program was particularly useful for PASOK to harness the support of its 
traditional following, satisfy key constituencies within the party, and counter pressure from 
parties on its left (Tsakonas 2010, 97). By the same token, the rhetoric of ‘strong Greece’ 
allowed PASOK to attack ND as a party unreliable for office (Lyrintzis 2005, 251; 
Vernardakis 2011, 21).  
Thus, while Helsinki was presented as a ‘European’ policy, Simitis’ rhetoric of ‘strong 
Greece’ contained nationalist undertones (Eleftheriou and Tassis 2013, 49) that crucially 
complemented efforts at mobilization of PASOK’s audience ahead of an electoral contest 
that was shaping up to be very close. Ultimately, heading the call of anti-Right polarization 
as PASOK’s main strategy, Simitis embedded Helsinki in a discourse that carried on the 
traditions of the ‘democratic camp’. This entailed sticking to traditional definitions of 
Greek goals and interests, all the while the new policy was presented as an ingenuous way 
to satisfy Greece’s European commitments. In managing to reconcile the new policy with 
PASOK’s polarization strategy, the modernizers won the party over but had at the same 
time to significantly curtail its ambition and scope.  
Helsinki of course did not go uncontested. The most vocal opponent was ND. ND was 
at the time in the middle of a process of renewal following the defeats of 1993 and 1996 
and splits that led to the departure of politicians both of its nationalist and its liberal wing. 
Led by Costas Karamanlis since 1997, ND found itself in an awkward position after Simitis 
made modernization and Europeanization PASOK’s goal. Karamanlis’ goal was to 
reestablish ND’s credibility as a governing party and as an agent of modernization without 
letting it slide back to the class-based neoliberal economics of the Mitsotakis years. Rather, 
his goal was to overcome the anti-Right polarization of PASOK by absorbing the 
discontent created by Simitis’ policies within a pro-European and modernizing framework.  
The opposition of ND to Helsinki accurately reflected the strategic constraints on the 
party at the time. While accepting the necessity of the European connection for Greece, 
Karamanlis objected to what seemed like a far-reaching reinterpretation of Greek foreign 
policy goals. His critique focused precisely on the ways the Helsinki agreement went 
against the established tenets of Greek foreign policy, namely the idea that there were 
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issues for negotiation in the Aegean that called for political bargains. The critique of 
Karamanlis was further elaborated in the work of his key foreign policy advisers, who 
argued that Helsinki was inviting sacrifices for Greece and set insufficient checks on 
Turkey’s aggression (Molyviatis 2002; Valinakis 2000). In this way, ND was reiterating 
the view that had become official Greek foreign policy since the 1980s, namely that Greece 
should refrain from negotiations with Turkey as much as possible, and was distancing 
somewhat from the legacy both of ND’s founder Constantine Karamanlis in the 1970s and 
Mitsotakis in the 1990s who pursued dialogue with Turkey.  
While agreeing with the goal of streamlining Greek foreign policy with European 
practices, Karamanlis opposed the agreement as not compatible with Greek interests 
traditionally understood. This was a difficult balance to maintain, but it was in agreement 
with government-opposition dynamics in a two-party system. Beyond just that though, the 
argumentations of ND in foreign policy closely mirrored the broader strategy of the party 
in the specific structure of polarization in the Greek party system. The goal of Karamanlis 
was to overcome anti-Right polarization by adopting a more popular profile and criticizing 
the externalities of Simitis’ adjustment program even if accepting in principle the goal of 
entry into the Eurozone (Alexakis 2001, 118; Pappas and Dinas 2006, 491). This would 
allow ND to absorb the nationalism-modernization cleavage that was running through its 
own body and attract support from voters disgruntled with PASOK’s turn (Lyrintzis 2005, 
254).  
Policy-empty two-party polarization then had repercussions for the way the foreign 
policy change was institutionalized beyond its immediate ratification. As expected by our 
analytical framework, the new foreign policy was partially institutionalized, especially 
since there was a government turnover merely four years after it had been instituted. 
Following its victory in the 2004 elections, ND undid essential aspects of the Helsinki 
bargain, suspending negotiations with Turkey over bilateral questions in the Aegean and 
preferring to keep pressure on Turkey through EU accession conditionality. In this way, 
the foreign policy change enacted in Helsinki ended up concerning mostly an atmospheric 
improvement of Greek-Turkish relations without forcing Greece into the potentially 
difficult decisions the original compromise entailed (e.g. negotiating territorial rights in the 
Aegean and recognizing some of Turkey’s claims). While ND elites accepted the essential 
logic behind Helsinki (to adapt dimensions of Greek foreign policy to the demands of 
European membership), partisan expediency (both in the sense of avoiding political costs 
but also, more broadly, of overcoming anti-Right polarization and neutralizing the 
nationalism-modernization latent cleavage) influenced the way the party put this policy in 
practice. That Helsinki ended up being partially institutionalized corresponds to our 
expectations about how new foreign policies will fare after party turnover in government 
in a policy-empty polarized two-party system.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
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The aim of this article was to highlight the ways a focus on political parties can help 
fill the holes left in the analysis of foreign policy change by other approaches. In the case 
of Greece and the foreign policy change in Helsinki, prominent accounts focus on political 
leadership, entrepreneurship and culture, domestic institutions, and the role of Europe in 
socializing actors into new conceptions of interests. The roots of the change can be found 
in the activities of the modernizers around Simitis, functioning as policy entrepreneurs (like 
Blavoukos and Bourantonis theorized), promoting their own conceptions of a problem-
solving policy (like Tsakonas analyzed) under the permissive condition of a changed 
international environment and the EU’s course towards enlargement in the late 1990s. 
However all these arguments can be strengthened further if one incorporates the partisan 
needs of PASOK that had to be served if the foreign policy change was to go through. A 
focus on the dynamics of the Greek party system further complements our understanding 
of the timing, content and institutionalization of the foreign policy change at Helsinki. For 
example, as Blavoukos and Bourantonis mention political benefits to entrepreneurs after 
formulating the foreign policy change, these benefits can be primarily conceptualized as 
winning elections and staying in office. By the same token, Tsakonas’ idea that leadership 
culture and general national culture interact in producing foreign policy change can be 
restated in terms of partisan actors engaging with the structures of the party system that 
embeds them. 
In terms of analysis of Greek foreign policy, the narrative here focused on the key 
feature of the Greek party system, the binary polarization between PASOK and ND, and 
the strategies of the two parties as they tried to absorb a latent nationalism-modernization 
cleavage into existing structures of competition. I conclude that there was nothing 
inevitable about the specific change that Greece instituted, nor was the timing of the 
decision self-evident due to external stimuli, policy failures and so on. New policy ideas 
and political leadership mattered, as did changes in Greece’s international environment and 
the impact of Europe, but the links between international and domestic factors pointing 
towards change are neither linear not clear-cut. The foreign policy change instituted in 
Helsinki needs to be problematized in terms of timing, degree and durability, and in this a 
focus on the context of the Greek party system is particularly rewarding. In short, policy 
ideas, leadership, political entrepreneurship or international pressures were conditioned by 
the opportunities and constraints contained in the structures of party competition.  
More generally this article has tried to point to the role of party competition as an 
intervening variable of foreign policy. While it is not very original to claim that political 
actors go around party politics to promote their preferred policies (obviously they do), this 
article has preferred to look at political agency as embedded in a wider structure of 
competition that shapes in many respects the content of new policies and the durability of 
foreign policy change. The structure and type of polarization of party competition helps us 
formulate expectations about the ways policymakers are constrained to formulate 
 18 
responses to new international conditions, policy crises etc. It was seen that especially in 
policy-empty polarized two-party systems, new policy ideas have a better chance to find 
their way into official policies if they are formulated according to the dynamics of polarized 
competition, which also means that in the process they are being adapted and altered to a 
significant degree.  
 
 
 
1 By the mid-1990s the issues Turkey considered ‘open’ were: a) The demarcation of the continental shelf, 
b) demarcation of territorial waters, c) demarcation of the air space over the Aegean, d) militarization of 
Eastern Aegean islands, e) sovereignty over specific islands and islets, f) the limits of each country’s 
operational air control over the Aegean Sea. For a thorough presentation of the legal parameters of these 
issues and an effort to present both sides of the argument, see Heraclides (2007, 217-382). 
2 See also the discussion in Economides (2005) and Moumoutzis (2011). 
3 This can be read inversely as well: The explanation one wants to prioritize to explain change informs how 
much of a change one thinks Helsinki is. 
4 On a theoretical discussion of the role of ideas in political change see, among others, Blyth (2003). 
5 Imia was the closest Greece and Turkey ever came to war. However previous crises were also perceived as 
very dangerous in Greece. The 1987 Aegean crisis had forced then Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, who 
had instituted a policy of ‘no dialogue’, to enter into discussions with Turkey.  
6 This should be the norm in two-party systems. See Downs (1957) for the classical statement.  
7 This is in essence an expansion of the argument of Mavrogordatos (1984), while Kalyvas’ (1997) analysis 
also agrees with it.  
8 PASOK went through a brief period of reassessment of its foreign policy in the late 1980s, following the 
1987 crisis that almost led to armed engagement with Turkey. Andreas Papandreou accepted a dialogue 
process with Turkey on some of the bilateral issues (chiefly the continental shelf). But he quickly reverted to 
his old positions, also because his domestic position was becoming increasingly tenuous politically and 
electorally. 
9 Important works on foreign policy change are, among many, Gustavson (1999), Goldmann (1988), Holsti 
(1982) and Welch (2005). 
10 On foreign policy and political parties see, among others, Hofmann (2013), Kaarbo and Beasley (2008) 
and Rathbun (2004). 
11  Notice analogies with debates in international relations (especially constructivist) literature on the 
relationship between actors and the social structures they are embedded in (see Dessler [1989] for the 
classical epistemological statement).  
12 Here I follow Vernardakis’ (2011) view of PASOK-ND competition in the 1980s and the early 1990s as 
reflecting tangible policy and social divides in Greece. Kalyvas (1997) challenges the view that PASOK and 
ND were genuinely separated by policy even in the 1980s.  
13 50% of the population still was claiming in opinion polls in October 1999 to be against lifting the veto on 
Turkey (Tsakonas 2010, 216, note 309). 
14 See PASOK and ND’s opinion poll standing throughout 1999-2000 in Simitis (2005, 645). 
15 On PASOK’s long-standing anti-Right polarization strategy, see the very good discussion in Eleftheriou 
and Tassis (2013, 134-148). 
16  Further cementing this argument, during the second Simitis government (2000-2004) Greece also 
proceeded to completely Europeanize its approach to the Balkans and the Macedonia name-dispute, by 
leading the drive to accept the Western Balkan countries as EU candidates. Again, this was far from PASOK’s 
populist positions up until the mid-1990s and its vehement opposition to Mitsotakis’ efforts to reconcile 
Greece’s Balkan policies and European membership.  
17 See Simitis’ speech presenting PASOK’s program ahead of the April 2000 elections, March 29, 2000, 
accessible in his personal webpage www.costas-simitis.gr. Also Economides (2005, 481-487). 
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18 Statements Simitis made at the presentation of the PASOK program for the April 2000 elections on March 
29, 2000, and at PASOK’s central electoral rally, April 7, 2000, accessible in his personal webpage 
www.costas-simitis.gr. 
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